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A NOTE ON ROWE'S "RESPONSE TO DICKER"
Georges Dicker
I am inclined to accept Rowe's ingenious demonstration that Anselm's (own)
argument begs the question, no less than the "Son of Anselm's Argument.'"
However, I would dispute the way in which Rowe represents the relation between
his position and mine. He writes:
Dicker['s] ... position is that Anselm's argument does not fall prey
to the objection of question-begging I advanced against the Son of
Anselm's argument. Against Dicker, however, I shall argue that
Anselm's argument does fall prey to the objection of question-begging
I advanced against the Son of Anselm's argument. 2
This implies that while my position is that Anselm's argument, unlike the Son of
Anselm's Argument, does not beg the question, Rowe has shown that it does. But
my position is, rather, that Anselm's argument does not beg the question in the way
that the Son ofAnselm's Argument begs it (by virtue of premiss 2, that God is a possible thing). That is why, as I put it, Rowe's original article leaves Anselm's own
argument "unscathed.'" Now this criticism leaves quite open the possibility that
Anselm's argument begs the question in some other way. Rowe's "Response"
seems to show that Anselm's argument does indeed beg the question in another way
(by virtue of premiss 1, that God exists in the understanding). Of course there is a
resemblance between the two cases of question-begging: in both cases asserting
that God has a certain status~ither as a possible thing, or as a thing in the understanding-turns out to be tantamount to asserting that He exists in reality. But the
two casesare nonetheless distinct. So far as I can see, then, the position in my
paper and the one in Rowe's response to it are not incompatible.'
SUNY at Brockport

NOTES
1. William L. Rowe, "Response to Dicker," Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 5, No.2, pp-204-205.
2. "Response to Dicker," 204.

3. Georges Dicker, "A Refutation of Rowe's Critique of Anselm's Ontological Argument." Faith
and Philosophy, Vol. 5, No.2, p. 193.
4. Admittedly, however, the last two sentences of my paper require qualification if Rowe is right
in thinking that Anselm's premiss 7 begs the question.
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